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Introduction
The understanding of the fundamental causes that generate uctuations in economic activity (`business cycles') has always occupied a prominent place in the research agenda of macroeconomists. According to the Keynesian tradition, the impulse source of business cycles comes from exogenous variations in aggregate demand conditions, which are propagated through the sluggish adjustment of prices; see, for example, Hicks (1937) . For the proponents of the`real business cycle' approach, price rigidity is not necessary as a propagation mechanism. Instead, the optimal response of agents to the presence of exogenous fundamental shocks and the process of capital accumulation su ce for these shocks to generate uctuations in major macroeconomic variables, e.g., Long and Plosser (1983) .
A third strand of the literature went one step further by arguing that even fundamental shocks are not necessary for the emergence of cyclical movements in economic activity.
Instead, non-monotonicities in the dynamic behavior of economic variables can generate periodic as well as aperiodic, but deterministic, orbits that resemble random ones, e.g., Grandmont (1985) .
Another issue that was given serious consideration by researchers was the possibility that economic uctuations may have deeper and permanent e ects on long-term measures of macroeconomic performance. Although some early economists gave considerable thought to the issue, e.g., Schumpeter (1934) , Kaldor (1954) and Kalecki (1954) , this line of thought was brought to a standstill with the onset and the ensuing popularity of the Keynesian framework of business cycle analysis { a framework which, by its very nature, is focused on short-run issues and is not concerned with longer-term questions such as the fundamental determinants of economic growth. It would actually take many years before the interest in the links between growth and cyclical volatility was revived. This occurred with the emergence of the`real business cycle' paradigm, which methodologically employed the neoclassical growth model so as to analyze the propagation of temporary fundamental shocks into uctuations in macroeconomic variables. From that moment, it did not take long for researchers to realize that stochastic endogenous growth models could provide the analytical tools through which one can illustrate the correlation between aggregate variability and the long-run trend of output growth. These ideas were spurred even further by the appearance of many empirical papers which showed a statistically signi cant relationship between economic growth and measures of aggregate variability; see, among others, Grier and Tullock (1989) , Ramey and Ramey, (1995) and Fatas (2002) .
This literature has proposed a clear causality running from volatility to output growth, e.g., Femminis (2001) , Canton (2002) and Blackburn and Varvarigos (2008) . The basic idea is that macroeconomic volatility impinges on the individuals' behavior and actions concerning variables that determine the accumulation of growth promoting factors, such as physical and human capital accumulation.
Nonetheless, given that some of the reasons for the emergence of cyclical uctuations are not necessarily exogenous, there is no a priori reason to presume that the empirically observed correlation between growth and volatility implies a causal link as well.
1 Addressing this argument successfully requires a model in which both the mechanisms that drive growth in the long-run and the incidence of growth volatility are attributed to the deep structural characteristics of the economic environment { i.e., they are endogenous. Whilst some authors have delved upon the construction and analysis of such frameworks, see, for example, Matsuyama (1999) and W• alde (2005), they focused purely on the conditions under which output growth may display periodic behavior over time. 2 Thus, it appears that there is still a void in the macroeconomics literature, resulting from the absence of a model that, in addition to reproducing endogenous growth cycles, will somehow correlate the incidence and/or magnitude of these cycles with the rate of economic growth, within the same framework of analysis.
Our paper aims at lling this void. It develops an overlapping generations model in which human capital constitutes the engine of growth. 3 The knowledge, skills and experience accumulated in the society are passed on to the next generation either through formal education and training or as the outcome of an "atmospheric" externality (intergenerational spillovers). While the latter form of knowledge transmission occurs freely, as one generation observes and imitates the other, the former requires the allocation of resources from the parents and the exertion of e ort from the children. Moreover, these two "inputs" are complementary in the learning process, in the sense that an increase in one raises the marginal product of the other. The strategic interactions between generations and the presence of the aforementioned forms of knowledge transmission generate 1 Indeed, Temple (1999) states that "there appears to be a negative relationship between output volatility and growth. . . as yet, the interpretation of the ndings is unclear" (p. 145).
2 For an example of a model that generates periodic equilibria in the real growth rate that are preference and not technology driven see the recent paper by Barnett and Bhattacharya (2008) . 3 Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Barro (2001) , among many others, provide evidence regarding the contribution of human capital to growth and development. rich dynamics. We show that multiple growth equilibria arise, some of them periodic and some aperiodic (chaotic). Moreover, the simultaneous existence of cyclical and stationary equilibria allow us to infer a negative correlation between volatility and growth.
However, the novelty of our approach is that there does not exist a one-way causal link between the incidence of volatility and lower growth. Rather, both volatility and growth can be attributed to the intrinsic uncertainty of the economy. This is because, in the presence of permanent cycles, the growth rate is strictly lower than the one obtained under a stationary equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that if the mechanisms through which decisions are made change, then the endogenous uctuations disappear and instead a unique balanced growth equilibrium emerges.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a rather standard model of human capital accumulation and growth. Section 3 derives the properties of the equilibrium and presents the implications for output growth. Section 4 considers an alternative form of interaction between generations, which removes the source of uctuations and multiplicity. Section 5 concludes the main text, while an Appendix derives some auxiliary results.
A Parsimonious Model of Private Education

Description
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N. Each period a new cohort of unit mass is born. Agents within each cohort are identical and live for two periods. 4 In the rst period of their life they are "young adults" (or "o spring") and in the second "old adults" or ("parents"). There is a single good in the economy. It is produced and supplied by perfectly competitive rms who employ e ective labor so as to produce Y t units of output according 4 In an earlier version of the paper we assumed that agents live for an additional third period in which they are retired. Nevertheless, such an extension did not o er any additional insights and for the sake of expository simplicity we decided to omit it.
where H t is the aggregate (and average) stock of human capital. H t corresponds also to the economy's available units of e ective labor because agents (whose large population is normalized to one) supply one unit of "raw" time each. Pro t maximization and perfect competition imply that the equilibrium market wage per unit of (e ective) labor is constant at w t = A 8t:
An agent born in period t enjoys utility over her entire lifetime according to the following simple functional form
where e t denotes schooling time when young, c t+1 stands for consumption when old and h t+2 is the human capital of an individual born in period t + 1; which will be put to use in period t + 2: A few remarks regarding the utility function (2) are in order. First, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that children do not consume or that the consumption of the children is included in the consumption of the parents. Second, the last term of the utility function indicates that parents are imperfectly altruistic towards their o spring. Specifically, a parent gets satisfaction by observing her o spring's income. This is meant to capture the idea that parents care about their o spring's future prospects and social status (both being enhanced through more advanced knowledge and/or increased income). 
where, it may be recalled that, h t+1 denotes the human capital of an agent born in period
The speci c functional form used in equation (3) In the second period of life, parents allocate their income w t+1 h t+1 between consumption c t+1 and their children's education q t+1 . Thus, an agent born in period t faces the following budget constraint in period t + 1
Agents' problem
Agents born in period t choose fe t ; h t+1 ; c t+1 ; q t+1 g; in order to maximize their lifetime utility (given by equation 2) subject to the learning technology (3), the budget constraint (4) and the non-negativity constraints for e t ; c t+1 ; and q t+1 ; taking H t ; H t+1 ; q t and e t+1 as given. If e t ; c t+1 ; and q t+1 are all positive then the rst-order necessary conditions for this problem simplify as follows
and the two constraints (3) and (4). Equations (5) and (6) describe, respectively, the optimal decision of an agent as a child (leisure vs. schooling) and as a parent (spending on child's education vs. spending on own consumption). They require that, at the optimum, the marginal bene t of each of these decisions be equal to the marginal cost.
We can view the situation described here as a game played between each pair of consecutive generations, that is, between parents and children. Each agent plays this game twice, once as a child and once as a parent. In any period t + 1; a parent, who was born in period t; chooses the amount of resources q t+1 that she will allocate on her child's education. At the same time, the child chooses the amount of time, or equivalently the e ort, e t+1 that she will devote on schooling. Nevertheless, when deciding her choice variable, each player takes the action of the other player as given.
If we combine (4) and (6), taking into account the non-negativity constraint q t+1 0;
we obtain q t+1 = max 0;
Obviously,
Equation (7) constitutes the mother's reaction function. As indicated in (8) , parents require that children put in a minimum level of schooling time/e ort, before they decide to spend any resources on their education. Moreover, ceteris paribus, parents will not allocate any resources towards their children's education if their wage income (w t+1 h t+1 )
or the e ciency of the education system ( ) are very small or if the rate at which human capital is transferred freely to the next generation (v) is very high. Furthermore, according to (7), even if positive, the exact income that parents spend on their children's education naturally depends positively on w t+1 h t+1 , and e t+1 and negatively on v: Finally, as it can be seen dq t+1 =de t+1 > 0; meaning that the daughter's schooling time is a (strategic) complement for the mother, that is, an increase in e t+1 raises the marginal return of education expenditure for the mother and makes her willing to increase her activity level.
Using (4) and (5), both updated one period, we can write
which is the reaction function of the children. Thus, it is not clear whether q t+1 constitutes a (strategic) complement or substitute for the children, since the sign of de t+1 =dq t+1 depends on q t+2 ; which depends on e t+2 ; which depends on e t+3 and so on ad in nitum.
Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium in this economy consists of sequences fe t g ; such that, given h 0 > 0; in every period t = 0; 1; : : : ; a) young agents choose e t so as to maximize their utility function, taking q t as given b) old agents choose q t and c t so as to maximize their utility, taking e t as given c) rms choose e ective labor so as to maximize their pro ts d) the labor market clears e) the goods market clears and f) h t = H t :
In equilibrium, since all young agents are identical H t = h t 8t: Substituting this equilibrium condition in (7); we have that
where = v=A : Obviously,
Also, if we substitute the equilibrium conditions w t = A and H t = h t 8t in (9), we obtain
Next, substituting (10) in (12) and backdating one period, we have e t+1 = f (e t ) = e t ( + e t ) 3e
which is a rst-order non-linear ordinary di erence equation in e t : 7 This equation determines the dynamic path of the schooling time. Having determined this, simple substitution in (3) and (10) yields the equilibrium path of human capital and education expenditure. Similarly, the equilibrium paths of the remaining variables result from substitution in the relevant equations.
Stationary Equilibria
The steady-state values of (13) are
7 We have also worked the solution with a utility function whose arguments are weighted di erently and found that the qualitative characteristics of the equilibrium remain the same. We chose the present formulation, because it allows us to focus our attention on the parameters that are, indeed, crucial for the characterization of the equilibrium. These parameters are the ones included in the composite term :
As shown in the Appendix, the parameter must satisfy the following constraint
Intuitively, if is su ciently high, which occurs for su ciently high values of v (the rate at which human capital is transmitted freely to the next generation) or for su ciently low values of A or (the e ciency parameter in production or in the education system, respectively), then no resources or time will be devoted to education. The graph of (13) The reason why the relationship between e t and e t+1 is non-monotonic is because there are two e ects present. On the one hand, if parents expect an increase in e t+1 they will raise q t+1 , which will decrease their consumption and their leisure, i.e., will raise e t : On the other hand, each unit of time invested in education yields now a higher rate of return (this is captured by the term w t+1 q t in equation 5); this generates an income e ect, which will induce parents to raise their leisure and o set the initial increase in e t (with the higher rate of return to education, parents can now earn the same income with a lower e ort e t ): The interaction of these two e ects gives rise to the U shaped curve of e t+1 as a function of e t drawn in Figures 1a and 1b.
Next we examine the stability of the two equilibria. The higher equilibrium is always repelling since f 0 (e 2 ) > 1: The stability property of the lower equilibrium e 1 , however, depends on the value of : For values of 2 (0; 0:147); f 0 (e 1 ) < 1 and hence e 1 is a repelling xed point; any orbit that starts near e 1 exhibits explosive oscillations (this 8 As shown in the Appendix (see equation R4),
We consider the case where = (2= p 3) 1 in footnotes 9 and 10 below and the case where = 0 at the end of Subsection 3.2 (see Proposition 3). 9 There are three more possible con gurations, which are not shown here. The rst is the case where e 1 = e min : This occurs when takes the value 0 (de ned in the Appendix). The second con guration that is not depicted is the case where e 1 = e 2 : This occurs when takes the value (2= p 3) 1: In this case the graph of the di erence equation is tangent to the 45 0 line. The last con guration that is not shown is the one where the graph of f does not intersect the 45 0 line. This occurs when does not satisfy (15) , that is > (2= p 3) 1: No interior equilibrium exists in this case. occurs in the case depicted in Figure 1a , when e 1 is su ciently far from e min ): For values of 2 (0:147; 0 ); where 0 ' 0:153 (see the Appendix); 1 < f 0 (e 1 ) < 0; nearby orbits converge to e 1 through damped oscillations (this occurs in the case depicted in Figure 1a , when e 1 is su ciently close to e min ). Finally, if 2 ( 0 ; (2= p 3) 1); then 0 < f 0 (e 1 ) < 1 and the convergence to e 1 is monotonic (this occurs in the case depicted in Figure 1b ).
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We summarize our results so far as follows.
Proposition 1. Equilibria are de ned for values of 2 [0; (2=
If lies in the interior of this interval, then there exist two steady-state equilibria, e 2 > e 1 . The highest equilibrium e 2 is always repelling, whereas the lowest equilibrium e 1 is either repelling or attracting depending on the value of ; which is a composite term consisting of structural parameters of the economy:
Dynamic Equilibria
The di erence equation (13) accepts also periodic equilibria. Indeed, consider the second iterate of f; f 2 (e t ) = f (f (e t )): This map has four xed points, e 1 ; e 2 ; given in (14) , and e c1 ; e c2 = 2 + + 2
The last two xed points of f 2 ; e c1 ; e c2 ; correspond to a 2-period cycle. Note that these are real and distinct if the quantity under the square root in (16) repelling and, at the same time, gives birth to an attracting 2-period cycle (the emergence of a 2-period cycle is illustrated in Figure 2 ). Notice that, in Figure 4a , the long-run value for e t appears to be zero for a wide range of permissible values of : This is because the software we used to generate this graph cannot take account of the fact that the initial condition of e t is not pinned down by the model. What actually happens is that, for these values of , agents will choose directly either e 1 or e 2 . there are no periodic solutions, while both xed points e 1 and e 2 are unstable. Since e t is not a predetermined variable and hence there does not exist any initial condition for it, it follows that for any value of below approximately 0:14 there exist two possible equilibria, e 1 and e 2 ; whereas for values of greater than 0:14 there exist in nitely many equilibria, some of them periodic and some aperiodic).
Finally, with regard to the equilibrium path of the other variables, it is easy to show that over the range of given by (15) , e > and hence e t+1 > ; consequently q t+1 > 0 (see equation 11). Given then the equilibrium path of e t+1 ; the behavior of q t+1 ; h t+1 and c t+1 follows from the system of equations (3), (5) and (10).
14 12 The Liapunov number L is de ned as L(x 0 ) = e (x0) ; where is the Liapunov exponent. "Intuitively, the Lyapounov exponent measures the average (exponential) rate of separation of the orbits of points near x from the trajectory generated by x; " Grandmont (2008, p. 163). In particular, an orbit is chaotic if the Liapunov exponent is positive or, equivalently, the Liapunov number is greater than unity. 13 The sequence f k g The following proposition summarizes our results so far in this subsection. The study of = 0 deserves particular attention. Recall that = 0 is implied by v = 0; that is, there is no externality in the transmission of knowledge and children learn only through formal education. Substituting = 0 in (10) we get q t+1 = Ah t+1 =2: Also, equations (4) and (5) yield c t+1 = Ah t+1 =2 and e t+1 = 2=3: Finally, substituting in the learning technology (3) we have h t+2 = Ah t+1 =3: Thus, Proposition 3. If = 0 then there is a unique balanced growth equilibrium path, and there no transitional dynamics, i.e., e t = 2=3, while all other variables grow at a constant rate 8t:
As it can be seen from (7), the reason behind the uniqueness of the equilibrium is that with = 0, the children's schooling time is not a strategic complement for the parents any more. Instead, the parents spend a xed share of their income on their children's education. 
Implications for Output Growth
Given h t = H t and equations (1), (3) and (10), we can write the (gross) growth rate of output as
Evidently, the stationary and dynamic properties of the growth rate are fully described by the corresponding properties of e t : Thus, the possibility of periodic behavior for e t implies the emergence of endogenous growth cycles. Furthermore, such equilibria arise in the neighborhood of e 1 : Combining this with e 1 < e 2 and G 0 > 0; our model surmises a negative correlation between volatility and growth.
Proposition 4. Economies that select equilibria in the neighborhood of e 1 will exhibit lower growth rate and, possibly, higher volatility compared with economies that select the parents vote on the tax rate that nances education spending. Interestingly, the complicated dynamics of e t do not emerge in that setting because individuals do not internalize the e ect of their own schooling decisions on aggregate income, which partially determines the level of public spending on education. 15 These results follow from the particular preferences that we use here.
high action equilibrium e 2 :
The idea that there is a negative correlation between volatility and growth is supported by strong empirical evidence; see, for example, Ramey and Ramey (1995) . However, our framework suggests a novel explanation for its emergence; mainly, that it is not greater volatility that necessarily causes a fall in the rate of economic growth. Rather, it is the situation leading to relatively lower growth that it is also responsible for generating permanent endogenous cycles. Hence, the link between volatility and growth is embedded to the structural characteristics of the economic environment and there is no a priori reason to presume any clear causality between the two phenomena. Volatility may be as much a cause of lower growth as lower growth is a cause of greater volatility. We illustrate this
by showing that if the mechanisms through which agents make decisions change, then the endogenous uctuations and the multiplicity of equilibria disappear.
Sequential Choices
In the model analyzed so far there is no structural uncertainty, but there is strategic uncertainty; that is, there is uncertainty regarding the strategy of the "other player".
This uncertainty is among the structural characteristics of the economy, as re ected in its institutions and the mechanisms through which decisions are made. In this section we alter the model so as to eliminate strategic uncertainty and show that doing so eliminates endogenous uctuations; instead, a unique balanced growth equilibrium emerges.
Consider the case where children commit to a certain level of schooling time/e ort and, given this choice, parents decide on the level of resources spent on education. 16 In terms of a concrete real-life example, we may think of scholarships and/or tuition fee waivers that are provided on the basis of students' success on achieving some performance targets.
In other words, as before parents who belong to generation t maximize (2) subject to (3) and (4) . The solution to this problem leads to (7) . Knowing (7), children who belong to generation t + 1 maximize (2) subject to (3), (4) (all updated one period) and (7) . This maximization leads to
and e t+2 vH t+2 + e t+2 q t+2 = 1 c t+2 :
The de nition of the equilibrium is the same as in the previous case with the exception of condition a), which now becomes a 0 ) the young agents choose e t so as to maximize their utility function, taking into account that the amount of resources that their parents will allocate on their education is related to their education e ort, i.e., q t is a function of e t and is given by equation (10) .
After applying the equilibrium condition H t = h t 8t, some straightforward but tedious algebra produces
Equation (20) is the counterpart of (13). For a positive value of e t+1 ; it is required that e t < (2 )=3: Moreover, recall from (10) that for a positive value of q t+1 ; it must be the case that e t+1 > or, using (20) , e t > (1 )=2: It is easy to show that g 0 (e t ) > 0 and g 00 (e t ) > 0: The reason behind the monotonicity of the g(e t ) function is that the rate of return to education, which in any period t+1 is now equal to w t+1 (@h t+1 =@e t ) = w t+1 (q t + e t (@q t =@e t )) = w t+1 h t =2; i.e., the term inside the parenthesis in (18) is independent of q t :
On the contrary, in the previous case the rate of return to education was equal to w t+1 q t (compare equations 5 and 18). Thus, the income e ect that generated the downward sloping part of (13) does not exist anymore.
The steady-state values of (20) (20) is depicted in Figure 6 . Given that e 0 2 is a repelling point and that e t is not a predetermined variable, there is only one equilibrium fe t g = fe 0 2 g 8t: In other words, there is no source of endogenous uctuations or multiplicity left in the model. 18 The behavior of the other variables follows then easily from the relevant equations.
17 Within this range of , 2 2 2 + 1 > 0 and hence e 0 2 is real and distinct from e 0 1 : 18 For a more direct investigation of the relation between strategic complementarity and the multiplicity of equilibria, see Cooper and John (1988) . 
Conclusions
We have presented a simple model of education and growth, which shares a lot of common features with previous models in the literature. We have shown that the strategic interactions in the learning technology between every pair of consecutive generations, parents and children, and the presence of an intergenerational externality lead to multiple growth equilibria, some of them periodic and some aperiodic. Crucial determinants of the dynamic equilibrium are the rate at which human capital is transmitted to the next generation as well as the e ciency in the education and output sectors. The model also creates volatility of the growth rate that emanates endogenously from the fundamentals of the economy. Finally, we have shown that if we change the mechanisms through which decisions are made then the endogenous uctuations and multiplicity disappear and a unique balanced growth equilibrium emerges.
Finally, we would like to conclude with the following comment, which o ers a more general perspective. The paper analyzed the interactions in knowledge transmission between consecutive generations. Abstracting from the particular context, we believe that our framework captures more general features regarding intergenerational interactions that can lead to endogenous uctuations. That is, similar games between generations abound in real life. For example, H could be a common resource, which is a ected by the actions of overlapping generations. Hence, we think that other intertemporal issues can be analyzed along the lines presented in this paper. The graph of f (e t ) is then given in Figures 1a and 1b (see also footnote 9).
A.3 Derivation of (16) Consider the map f given in equation (13) . The second iterate of f; f 2 (e) = f (f (e)) is A periodic point of period 2 is a xed point of the f 2 map: Solving the equation f 2 (e) = e;
we nd four such xed points. Two of them are the xed points of the map f; which is expected since xed points of f are also xed points of each iterate of f: The other two xed points are the ones given in (16) .
